Duplicate » admin by request

Refrigeration Cyberattacks Hit European Supermarkets and French Blood Banks

Black server cabinet with glowing orange data lines streaming from its side against a dark circuitry background.

Overnight on October 11, attackers took remote control of refrigeration systems in French supermarkets and kept the defrost cycles running until fridges and freezers warmed up. Some units were pushed as high as 50°C, and by morning stores from Intermarché to Carrefour were throwing out chilled and frozen stock. The French government later said the attacks hit about 700 retail sites, from supermarkets to butcher shops.

Three weeks later, it happened again. Overnight into November 2, refrigeration controls at supermarkets in Belgium, Sweden, Estonia and several other European countries were tampered with in the same way, and a French blood service found settings changed at three of its storage sites.

Retail cyberattacks usually go after tills, warehouses and back-office systems, as when the UNFI attack left grocery shelves bare in 2025. These attacks went after the equipment that keeps the food cold, and most of the ways in were basic security gaps with known fixes.

How Attackers Turned Fridges Into Heaters

Refrigeration controllers are small computers that run a store’s fridges, freezers and cold rooms. Many are connected to the internet so refrigeration contractors can monitor temperatures and fix faults remotely. That saves a site visit, but it also gives anyone who finds the login page a way in.

In France, attackers took over controllers running older versions of Danfoss software and triggered the built-in defrost function, which is meant to clear ice but heats the unit when it’s left running. Early French reports put the count at 250 to 350 stores, and Paris prosecutors opened an investigation that includes fires linked to the attack.

France’s government cyber alert service warned that Danfoss, Copeland and Dixell controllers were all being targeted and that attack campaigns were probably still underway. Its advice was blunt: an end-of-life device left on the internet is very likely to be compromised, and a factory reset won’t stop it from being hit again.

Industrial control panel mounted on a wall with glowing orange circuit lines, connected to large machinery in a dim factory environment. » admin by request

The Second Wave Reached Blood Storage

The November attacks were smaller per company but spread much wider. No chain reported more than several dozen affected stores, with incidents at Delhaize, Carrefour, Intermarché, Spar, IKEA, Coop and SuperValu, plus butchers and small shops in the Netherlands. Danfoss said the Dutch systems that were hit weren’t on a secure network and still used default passwords, and that most Dutch shops had taken precautions after the French attack.

Healthcare was caught up too. On November 3, the French Blood Establishment (EFS) confirmed that an incident at a refrigeration equipment provider altered temperature and defrost settings at three of its blood-storage facilities. The incident started with the provider that maintains the equipment.

Swedish chain ICA described a similar setup. Its central systems weren’t affected, but a small number of stores that relied on an outside supplier’s refrigeration connection were hit, and one store found its fridges and freezers set to 50°C.

Contractor Access Was a Common Thread

Many of the affected systems weren’t run by the stores at all. Refrigeration is often installed and maintained by outside contractors, and remote access comes with the service. Reporting on the second wave found that some maintenance companies had enabled remote access against manufacturer guidance, and that some control systems sat directly on the public internet behind default or easily guessed passwords.

That leaves a gap in ownership. The store’s IT team may not know the controller exists, the contractor treats the connection as a maintenance tool, and the manufacturer has already published guidance that nobody applied. Each party assumes someone else is looking after security.

Contractors do need a way in. But when that access is always on, shared across many sites, or protected by a factory password, it becomes the easiest door for an attacker too.

Probing Came Before the Second Wave

The November attacks weren’t a surprise to everyone watching. A Scottish security firm running decoy systems that mimic Danfoss controllers recorded 276 break-in attempts from 91 sources between October 20 and 30, trying factory-default passwords and known vulnerabilities. Activity peaked on October 26 and stopped days before the attacks began, and one analyst said attackers mostly used flaws that had already been patched.

Probing like this is easy to dismiss as background noise, since internet-facing devices see login attempts all the time. A sudden spike against one type of device is different. It suggests someone is building a target list.

On November 9, France formally blamed Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps for the October attacks, and Paris prosecutors are seeking arrest warrants. That is France’s assessment, and Iran hadn’t responded publicly when it was announced. No one has been named for the November wave, and it isn’t yet clear whether the two waves are linked.

What Operators Should Check Now

On November 5, CISA, the FBI and three other US agencies published joint guidance for refrigeration operators. Its advice applies to any site running connected building or facilities equipment, not only supermarkets:

  • Find what faces the internet. List every controller, panel and building system that can be reached from outside, then decide whether each one needs to be.
  • Remove default credentials. Change factory usernames and passwords on every device, and add multifactor authentication where the system supports it.
  • Restrict and log remote access. Limit changes to approved devices and IP addresses, put any remote access you still need behind a secure gateway, and review the logs. That includes access held by contractors and equipment providers.
  • Patch or retire old devices. Keep firmware current and plan to replace controllers that no longer get security fixes.
  • Set safe limits. Configure setpoint ranges so a unit can’t be pushed to dangerous temperatures, and alert on anything outside them.
  • Treat probing as a warning. Repeated login attempts against a device are often the first sign it’s on someone’s list.

If a controller may already be compromised, check its full configuration, especially defrost schedules, before putting it back into service.

Futuristic data server on a glowing circuit-board, with orange energy arcs linking components. » admin by request

Facilities Equipment Belongs in the Security Plan

Fridges, heating, ventilation and door systems tend to sit outside the IT team’s view, managed by facilities staff and outside contractors. Once these systems are online, they need the same basics as any server: an owner, a current inventory, strong credentials and controlled remote access.

The fixes here aren’t new. The stores that were hit tended to have exposed devices, unchanged passwords or outdated software, and each of those shows up in a basic device inventory.

For a closer look at locking down contractor access and connected equipment without disrupting operations, read our guide on how to secure OT/IT convergence.

About the Author:

Picture of Pocholo Legaspi

Pocholo Legaspi

Pocholo Legaspi is a content writer at Admin By Request, where he covers privileged access management, endpoint security, threat analysis, and the wider cybersecurity issues facing IT teams. With over a decade in content marketing and SEO and a master's in business informatics, he writes about complex security topics in a way that's clear and useful for the IT teams putting them into practice.

Authors

  • Admin By Request content writer, Pocholo Legaspi

    Pocholo Legaspi is a content writer at Admin By Request, where he covers privileged access management, endpoint security, threat analysis, and the wider cybersecurity issues facing IT teams. With over a decade in content marketing and SEO and a master's in business informatics, he writes about complex security topics in a way that's clear and useful for the IT teams putting them into practice.

    View all posts Content Writer
  • Paul Fisher

    Paul Fisher is Head of Global Strategy at Admin By Request and has written about enterprise IT since 1991, first as a journalist and editor, then as an analyst. As Lead Analyst for PAM and IAM at KuppingerCole, he wrote the firm’s benchmark PAM market research and moderated the PAM track at the European Identity and Cloud Conference. He’s a regular speaker at major identity and cybersecurity events, and he advises organizations on PAM, IAM, and security platform implementations.

    View all posts Head of Global Strategy

Share this blog to your channels: